India–US Trade Agreement: Abdication vs Pragmatism in the India–US Trade Agreement
There is a very fine line between abdication—giving up judgment, accountability, or principle—and pragmatism—giving in to the art of the doable. One example is the framework trade agreement between the United States and India.
Naturally, the theater of the agreement dominates public conversation, portraying it as a series of booming declarations of India’s might and the Prime Minister’s intelligence. But its defense is based on two framings. The first is the triumphalist America lobby, which holds that India and the United States are inextricably linked. Both sides will be unable to break free from this expanding embrace, which it views as a new strategic breakthrough.
India–US Trade Agreement: Economic Pragmatism and the Promise of Market Access
The economic pragmatists come in second. The deal is preferable to the current situation. It eliminates punitive tariffs on Russia. It allows India to reenter the US market, which might make Indian exports more competitive. It might solidify India’s openness trajectory and enable the reintroduction of a China-plus-one strategy. Additionally, it may even lead to reforms, upending long-standing beliefs about genetically modified organisms and non-food agriculture.
Nobody can predict how all of this will turn out. There isn’t a comprehensive agreement yet, and its success will rely as much on competitor behavior, internal changes, and the development of Sino-US ties as it will on any formal pact.
India–US Trade Agreement: Asymmetric Tariffs and the Return of Imperial Commerce
However, the arrangement does not pass the smell test, even if we accept that it has some realistic economic potential. This is not a mutual free-trade deal, to begin with. America is playing for imperial dominance, not reciprocal equality, as Trump has made obvious. This disparity is reflected in the agreement even on its own terms. For India, the new tariff system is worse than the one in place before Trump’s election.
The tariff structure favors the US in a way that is reminiscent of imperial commerce in the 19th century: India lowers duties to zero, while the US imposes rates as high as 18%. Even more startling is India’s pledge to buy $500 billion worth of American products over five years. What kind of free trade agreement requires one side to buy a lot of items from the other party?
India–US Trade Agreement: From Free Trade to Mercantilist Extraction
Additionally, this commitment may skew India’s policy decisions. Such large-scale purchase targets run the risk of changing industrial strategy and enhancing resilience by decree rather than by design. With significant strategic ramifications, they are also probably only going to be satisfied by a significant shift in defense procurement. Despite our economists’ ideologically confusing rhetoric, this is hardly an accord for openness and free trade. It is a mercantilist extraction pact that makes people more vulnerable.
Trade, Geopolitics, and the Cost of Strategic Concessions
Trade is always more than just trade. India has already made critical concessions. India’s stance on the conflict in Ukraine was a prime example of obfuscation. However, it is a whole different matter to be forced under coercion to stop buying Russian oil, which is something one might have decided to do on principle.
Does anyone recall the bold declaration made by our government that no authority would be permitted to define India’s relations with foreign countries? Now, that assertion seems flimsy. We let it happen all the time. The outcome of the war in Ukraine is just one of many variables that will ultimately affect India-Russia relations. However, the harsh reality is already apparent: foreign pressure, rather than India’s own judgment, is increasingly determining its interactions with other states. On this point, we are formally placing ourselves under observation.
The natural sinews of connection between America and India can stay strong as long as both countries continue to be open societies. These relationships are genuine and significant. However, at the level that matters for national security, they should not be mistaken with strategic alignment.
The American state’s political economy and designs are a very different matter. In the areas that are most important to India’s security—its immediate neighborhood—the United States does not view India as a strategic partner. Washington has prioritized short-term American goals over Indian concerns about Pakistan on several occasions and will do so going forward. In the past, the United States has often been interested in controlling regional conflicts rather than ending them, keeping them from blowing up while maintaining control over all sides.
The verdict is still pending on China, which is considered to be the foundation of Indo-US convergence. The United States’ main goal is to control China’s dominance in a way that benefits it, not to ensure India’s ascent. India is viewed in this policy less as an independent pole and more as a tool that can be used when pressure is required and removed when it is convenient. These instrumental alignments are reversible, and frequently suddenly so, according to the history of great-power politics. It is a flagrant misuse of terminology to refer to this accord as a strategic breakthrough.
It is true that liberal internationalist conflicts waged in the name of advancing democracy have decreased. However, this should not be interpreted as a retreat from imperial authority. A more arbitrary and transactional declaration of supremacy that depends on financial leverage, regulatory coercion, sanctions, tariffs, and even military involvement has taken its place. Even in areas that should firmly be under local control, the US is placing a growing amount of pressure on regulatory conformance: data regimes, trade standards, and regulatory frameworks. Sovereignty is hollowed out in practice but not denied in principle when it interacts with others.
Stable institutional commitments no longer serve as the foundation for American agreements. This fact is reflected in the framework agreement. Formally, it allows for renegotiation between the parties. However, it incorporates asymmetries that favor American leverage in a substantive way. India is the country that blinks when pressure is applied, according to recent experience.
Realists acknowledge power imbalances. It’s quite another to absorb it so thoroughly that one loses the ability to make one’s own decisions. In the sake of practicality, we might wish to compromise; we might even want to salvage our agreement so that the repercussions are not too severe. However, this is not a victory. The stench of our own decline cannot be covered up by the fragrance of official declarations.
This article is based on and inspired by an opinion piece published in The Indian Express, titled “India-US deal is one-sided. It creates vulnerabilities”, dated February 10, 2026. The original article reflects the analysis and views of its author(s). This version is adapted for contextual discussion and independent commentary.