Introduction: India’s Strategic Role in the Indo-Pacific
Given its strategic worth, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), a key regional organization that links Asia, Africa, and Australia, is facing cost constraints and governance issues. With two-thirds of the world’s population living there and 75% of global trade being led, the Indian Ocean Region has significant geostrategic application. In the larger Indo-Pacific context, where great power competition continues to impact maritime governance and security, India’s readiness to chair IORA starting in November 2025 is a vital chance to shore up regional ties and advance its strategic goals.
India’s Maritime Security and SAGAR Doctrine
The Indo-Pacific, which has key Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) that hold the majority of India’s trade and energy, is vital to the country’s maritime security. Securing these waterways is crucial to ensuring national sovereignty and economic resilience in light of China’s emerging hostility, particularly in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. This maritime-first strategic vision is seen in India’s SAGAR doctrine. The Indian Ocean routes more than 95% of India’s total trade. India has stepped up patrols around Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz, two key chokepoints in the Indo-Pacific.
The advancement of India through integrated supply chains and economic ties is heavily reliant on the Indo-Pacific region. India is using this region to lure manufacturing, diversify trade, and improve ties to the digital and green economies in an era of China+1 tactics. This drive includes activities like IPEF and free trade agreements with the UAE and Australia. Given its eye on reliable supply chains, India became a member of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in 2022.
India’s Digital Public Infrastructure and Regional Connectivity
In line with its Digital Public Infrastructure strategy, India relies on the Indo-Pacific region to advance digital connectivity and infrastructure. As part of its G20 presidency, India formed the Global Digital Public Infrastructure Repository (GDPIR), a virtual platform aimed to aid in the sharing of knowledge and best practices on large-scale digital public infrastructure (DPI) development. Launched in September 2023, the India- Middle East- Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) connects India to Europe across the Gulf of Mexico and the Indo-Pacific.
Climate Resilience and the Blue Economy Initiatives
Disasters caused by climate change, such as cyclones, rising sea levels, and coral loss, could affect the Indo-Pacific region. via IORA, the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, and its leadership in the blue economy, India is leading the charge on climate resilience efforts. This boosts India’s soft power and opens doors for green finance and sustainable maritime development.
India can assert itself as the Global South’s democratic and civilizational leader thanks to the Indo-Pacific. India is shaping regional standards about inclusivity, development, and sovereignty through its leadership of IORA (2025–27). In addition, this enhances India’s objective for multilateral and UN reform. Amid worries over failure, India supported the New Delhi Leader’s Declaration during the G20 presidency and hosted the Voice of the Global South Summit in 2024.
In particular, when compared to China and the US, India’s weak naval resources, financial limits, and logistical challenges limit its ability to project influence throughout the Indo-Pacific. India lacks long-range deployment capabilities, overseas military bases, and steady finance for maritime control, despite its rising ambitions. This limits its range outside of the Indian Ocean. The capital expenditures allotted to the military in 2023–2024 nearly met their anticipated needs. The Army, Navy, and Air Force’s spending, however, was 4% less than the budget estimate at the revised estimate stage. China’s defense spending, on the other hand, outpaced 7% in 2025 and was actively deployed in Cambodia and Djibouti.
India’s strategic decisions and relationships are not guided by a single, institutionalized Indo-Pacific policy framework. Given the fact that there is the SAGAR, Act East, and Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, partners find it less clear, and regional messaging gets fractured due to the lack of a single doctrine. India’s reputation as a leader in multilateral forums is weakened as a result. India’s strategy is still a patchwork of projects, in contrast to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy (2022) or Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.
India’s aim of strategic independence restricts its capacity to fully support like-minded alliances (such as the Quad and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity) in opposition to China’s aggression. Making an effort to engage China diplomatically in SCO and BRICS forums at the same time creates uncertainty and delays decision-making. As a result, India is less dependable in crucial security alignments. India’s strategic independence makes security alignments unclear. Its balancing act is clearly shown by its cautious approach to AUKUS and its ongoing defense connections with Russia (the S-400 deal despite CAATSA worries).
India’s economic integration in the Indo-Pacific region has been weakened by its conservative trade stance, which is seen by its withdrawal from the RCEP and its low FTA depth (data localization restrictions). This lessens India’s influence in regional economic diplomacy and harms its reputation as a long-term trading partner, in particular when contrasted with ASEAN, China, and Japan. India has only 13 active free trade agreements as of 2024, significantly fewer than ASEAN, and withdrew from the RCEP in 2019. However, since 2010, ASEAN- China economic activity has more than doubled, rising from USD 235.5 billion to USD 507.9 billion in 2019.
In Indo-Pacific organizations such as IORA, BIMSTEC, and IPOI, bureaucratic slowness, a lack of specialized funding, and weak administrators all work against India’s influence. India often encounters challenges in operational delivery and follow-through in regional capacity-building, even when it has big aims. For example, the Indian Ocean Rim Association only has a few million dollars in funding. By the way, the Indian Ocean Commission, which oversees just five Indian Ocean nations, has a budget of $1.3 billion for the 2020–25 period.
Urgent issues within the nation (such as border disputes or economic downturns) and regional instability (such as in West Asia or Nepal) regularly divert India’s attention from the Indo-Pacific. These inhibit consistent regional participation, reduce diplomatic bandwidth, and restrict sustained attention. India’s oil supply lines and cargo were directly disrupted by the Houthi interruptions in the Red Sea and the Gaza conflict (2023–25), which prompted naval redeployments. Meanwhile, diplomatic attention was diverted in 2024 by problems with Canada and the Maldives.
Compared to its Indo-Pacific rivals, India’s port infrastructure, coastal logistics, and shipbuilding capabilities are still lacking, which limits its ability to reach a wider demographic strategically and economically. India’s naval access and marine trade are impacted by the lack of deep-sea port capabilities and the delays in kicking off projects like Sagarmala. This hinders India’s aspirations for connectivity and the blue economy. According to the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (2023), India is ranked 38th. China’s Gwadar Port received more than $2.5 billion in new investment under CPEC, whereas India’s major strategic project, Chabahar Port, only partially became operational.
A single National Indo-Pacific Strategy has to include India’s several policy strands, including Act East, IPOI, SAGAR, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). India’s interests, red lines, engagement instruments, and sectoral objectives in the marine, economic, and normative domains should all be spelled out in this strategy. External clarity and internal coherence would be improved by a unified, government-mandated doctrine. Apart from that, this will support India’s positioning as a regional stabilizer and provider of net security.
Challenges Hindering India’s Influence in the Indo-Pacific
India must upgrade its fleet, sign logistics-sharing agreements, and set up forward presence facilities to increase its naval operational footprint in the Indo-Pacific and exhibit its maritime leadership. Sea lane security requires protecting access to island territories, improving undersea domain awareness, and augmenting mission-based deployments. Projects like coastal radar chains, MDA networks, and deep-sea ports in the Indian Ocean littorals should be India’s top priorities. India will change from a coastal to an entirely Indo-Pacific maritime power as an outcome of these moves.
By advocating targeted collaboration on marine security, connectivity, key technologies, and disaster response, India should strengthen its position in the Quad, IORA, IPOI, BIMSTEC, and trilaterals like India- France- Australia. India can influence regional standards through mini-lateral frameworks that offer agility without the traditional alliances’ rigidity. To cut down on duplication, India must also establish coordination channels between various groups. India’s diplomatic capital is multiplied by the depth of its institutions.
India needs to boost the finish line of key connectivity projects like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), the Kaladan Multi-Modal Project, and the Chabahar Port. These ought to be quality-driven, time-bound, and based on sustainability and local ownership. In order to expedite infrastructure diplomacy, India should also increase the number of Project Preparation and Delivery Units (PPDUs). The new currency of strategic influence is the delivery of infrastructure.
India ought to be at the core of developing an inclusive Blue Economy architecture that focuses on island livelihoods, ocean energy, marine conservation, and sustainable fisheries. Coastal resilience and climate adaptation should be included in regional cooperation, particularly through IPOI and IORA. This regional agenda is connected to India’s leadership in the International Solar Alliance (ISA) and the CDRI. This is in line with sustainable development and climate justice in marine diplomacy.
India’s strategy to economic integration in the Indo-Pacific region needs to be measured but progressive. This entails actively participating in IPEF’s trade, digital, and supply chain pillars as well as strengthening free trade agreements with ASEAN, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates. India can establish itself as a reliable substitute for China by fortifying its value chains in the fields of semiconductors, rare earths, green technologies, and pharmaceuticals. These initiatives should be supported by trade facilitation, customs changes, and institutional trade capability.
For each thematic pillar, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) has to go from a conceptual vision to an operational platform with clear project pipelines, anchor nations, and roadmaps. To coordinate training, research, and policy, India should set up an expert task force, financing mechanism, and secretariat under IPOI. Structure puts aim into effect. India’s leadership in environmental standards and maritime governance would be formally established as a result. In the Raisina Dialogue 2025, India’s foreign affairs minister said, “You are looking at a very anarchic world if you don’t have an order.”
Leverage Diaspora, Cultural, and Educational Diplomacy: India has to make investments in long-term soft power instruments by establishing digital, cultural, and educational ties with countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Trust may be enhanced by forming research hubs with a marine focus, giving scholarships for strategic studies and the Blue Economy, and advocating cross-cultural interactions. It is important to tap into India’s diaspora in the Gulf, Australia, and Southeast Asia as strategic assets. India’s outlook can be made more global by establishing “Indo-Pacific Chairs” in academic institutions and think tanks.
Conclusion: India’s Path to Becoming an Indo-Pacific Power
The role of India in the Indo-Pacific region is at a turning point that calls for a well-thought-out plan, improved marine capabilities, and increased regional integration. India must take the lead in connectivity, trade, and security as IORA chair from 2025 to 2027 while striking a balance between strategic independence and effective alliances. India’s position as a major Indo-Pacific force would be anchored through the strengthening of institutional frameworks and economic diplomacy.
Based on “Charting a Route for IORA under India’s Chairship,” published in The Hindu on March 22, 2025, this article highlights the funding and governance challenges facing IORA. As India takes on the chairship in 2025, it has a key opportunity to strengthen regional cooperation and expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific.