The Moral Argument Behind Iran Regime Change
Western interventionists argued for years that the risks of a violent foreign regime change were outweighed by the long-term costs of Iran’s democratic system, which included social stagnation, economic decline, and repression. The brutal assault on protesters in January and the widespread positive coverage of the Iranian opposition in Western media last month greatly reduced the “moral barrier” to involvement.
Following the US-Israeli action, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump both called on Iranians to “rise.” Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s and other senior Iranian officials’ assassinations were hailed as a significant victory. It is far from guaranteed, though, that the departure of a major figurehead will result in a “short and decisive rupture” followed by a seamless transition. The supporters of intervention may not even want to see Iran under Ayatollah Khamenei.
Lessons from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya
Three recent events in the wider Middle East demonstrate why external involvement is unlikely to bring about stability and a peaceful transition. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya serve as examples of how external military actions are met with instability rather than quick stabilization. One glance at these nations’ scores on the Worldwide Governance Report makes it clear.
Results from the World Bank. Following the US invasion, Afghanistan had a change of government in 2001, which led to two decades of conflict and attacks on civilians. The overthrown government returned to power in 2021, but stability is still elusive.
After the US invasion in 2003, Iraq had several insurgencies and a civil war; despite efforts at democratization, the nation has yet to regain the stability that existed before 2003. After a NATO-led intervention in 2011, Libya collapsed, falling from having high stability scores on the Worldwide Governance Indicators to among the lowest in the world, with no signs of recovery. Tripoli and Benghazi continue to serve as the nation’s two centers of government. None of these nations has returned to the stability they had before the intervention. Instead of the “brief adjustment” that interventionists promised, their courses are characterized by persistent fragility and volatility.
Why Iran Is Structurally Different from Past Regime Change Cases
Iran’s system differs greatly from the regimes that fell in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Ayatollah Khamenei’s killing might have a significant effect without leading to the fall of the state. Khamenei’s death might be seen as the realization of a martyrological script inside the symbolic universe of Shia Islam, which is the religion to which the vast majority of Iranians belong. It is possible to interpret death at the hands of the enemies of Islam as a redemptive journey rather than a defeat; unlike past Middle Eastern kings who were overthrown or executed, this is not a bitter collapse. Rather, it is an idealized conclusion: the sacrificial death that sanctifies political existence.
A sizable section of the populace, including those who had previously criticized the government, may be persuaded to support a national defense narrative by this martyrological framing. The state can incite a wave of nationalist unity and a deep-seated animosity towards outside intervention by portraying a fallen leader as a martyr of “foreign aggression.” This could bring the security forces and traditionalist segments of society together in a way that regime change advocates had not expected.
Given the results of recent rallies, this might be more difficult now than it was during the June 2025 conflict with Israel. Nonetheless, it is still very likely. It’s also critical to remember that the experiences of Afghanistan, Libya, and Iraq show that protracted instability can result from external involvement when bureaucratic, security, and financial institutions are not intact.
The main concern for Iran at this time is whether territorial integrity and administrative cohesiveness can be maintained. The continuation of the “deep state,” the tenacious civil bureaucracy and technocratic class that oversees the nation’s financial and vital services, is crucial to achieving this.
The Role of the IRGC and the Artesh in Territorial Integrity
The state might escape the complete “atomization” observed in Libya if the central bank, ministries, and regional governorates carry on with their operations in spite of the leadership’s absence. Furthermore, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular army (Artesh) must remain united to maintain territorial integrity.
Leadership Vacuum and the Struggle for a National Unifier
Finding a “national unifier” in the current environment would be a significant problem. The connection between the populace and the political elite has been severely damaged by the brutal suppression of the January rallies, making it challenging for any member of the establishment to claim widespread legitimacy.
The late supreme leader’s spiritual authority is lacking, even though a “technocratic-military council” headed by individuals with managerial experience, like Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, former President Hassan Rouhani, or Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran Ali Larijani, might try to step in and provide a “security-first” stabilization. Any new leadership will probably find it difficult to project authority in the absence of someone who can bridge the gap between the resentful street and the security apparatus driven by survival.
There is a greater chance of disintegration and ongoing war if institutional continuity is compromised or if the army and the IRGC start to compete. In this case, the violent upheaval that some demand today would signal the start of a long-standing cycle of instability that will cost Iranian society as a whole dearly. Two things could influence such a result.
Decline of the Middle Class and Political Stability
The first is the decline of the middle class. The very social group that historically acts as a stabilizing force during political transitions has been severely damaged by decades of Western sanctions. Armed groups or radicalized relics of the current security system are more likely to fill the political void left by the protracted war in Iran in the absence of a strong middle class.
Hardline cadres in the IRGC and the Basij, in particular, who view any new system as an existential threat to their lives and property, are unlikely to vanish or “merge peacefully,” as the Trump administration seems to hope. They are more likely to become decentralized insurgency organizations rather than state actors, utilizing their in-depth familiarity with the nation’s infrastructure to undermine any efforts at a smooth transition.
Social fragmentation comes in second. Iran has more linguistic and ethnic diversity than the typical Middle Eastern nation. The potential of state disintegration and the emergence of several militias should not be undervalued in the absence of a central authority and with the current targeting of security leadership.
In the worst case, the fault lines of current discontent are likely to be followed by domestic unrest. As central authority declines, long-simmering insurgencies among the Arab, Kurdish, and Baluch people in the borderlands may intensify into full-fledged separatist wars.
Localized unrest could result from the breakdown of a cohesive security chain in large cities, where renegade militias could fight for control of local resources. A bloody “war of the elites” is also unavoidable since the surviving political and military titans would find it difficult to take over as leaders, possibly transforming the state’s own institutions into succession battlegrounds.
Iran Regime Change: Bitter Ending or Endless Bitterness?
Some have recently used the adage “a bitter ending is better than endless bitterness” to defend foreign military action in Iran. Such views appear to be predicated on the idea that military action can bring about a speedy conclusion.
However, war results are not linear; rather, they are triggers for unforeseen and extended degradation, as evidenced by the data from Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan. Although Ayatollah Khamenei’s passing symbolizes the end of an era, history indicates that the “expected value” of such a catastrophic upheaval is frequently a route of institutional decay and chronic instability rather than institutional rejuvenation. The “bitter ending” of a government may not be the last act of suffering for the Iranian people; rather, it may be the beginning of a new, deeply ingrained period of “endless bitterness” that could linger in the area for many years to come.